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Summary: This paper investigates to what extent tax burden can be used to compare countries with different pension systems. 
It was concluded that in one respect tax burden ratios used by international institutions fail to completely represent the 
share of income left after taxation, as the contributions paid to occupational pension funds are not included in total tax 
burden calculations. In our approach, however, in case of pension contributions it is the obligation of the payment itself 
and not the recipient of payment that matters. To this end, a new ratio called the ‘share of disposable current revenues’ was 
introduced to indicate the current income employers and employees can dispose of after all mandatory payments have been 
settled. Mandatory payments in this sense include all payment obligations employers cannot evade to pay to an institution 
(state, pension fund, etc.)
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We aimed to find out whether the comparison 
of tax and contribution revenues allows us to 
get an adequate image on the extent of the 
government’s redistribution of income.
At first glance, the situation is a simple one, as 
international institutions compile information 
about the share of revenues resulting from 
tax and social security contributions in each 
country compared to their GdP on an annual 
basis. The most frequently used table shows the 
ratio of taxes and contributions to the GdP 
in each country by adding up their values. in 
another method, the total amount of taxes and 
social security contributions are divided by the 
GdP of the given year separately. The indicators 
produced this way, however, do not contain the 
amounts paid into occupational pension funds, 
as these are considered private revenues (that is, 
revenues outside of public finances). 
First, we analyse the current indices of the 
tax burden and the contribution revenues 
of occupational pension funds. Since the 
contributions for pension purposes not paid 
to the state are also regarded as payments 
enforced by the state in our article, we add 
them to the contributions paid to the state. 
Then we can calculate our proposed indicators: 
the ratio of disposable current revenues. 
The novel evaluation of burdens could also 
influence the perception of competitiveness in 
the classification of countries.
E-mail address:  andras.giday@gmail.com 
tatay.tibor@hotmail.com
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THe IndICaTOrs OF THe TOTal Tax 
burden
Many indicators are calculated regarding the 
extent of state tax and contribution burdens. 
These ratios are designed to demonstrate the 
extent of revenues centralized by the state as 
well as the extent of the state’s redistributive 
role. These ratios are substantial from the point 
of tax-competitiveness, as they evaluate the 
labour-related burdens carried by employers 
and employees and the extent of the employee’s 
net disposable revenues. The potential impacts 
of high payments are elaborated in the study 
of Mádi and Árva (2016), amongst others.
There are also several studies examining the 
sustainability of the pension system operated 
by the specific states. By sustainability, the 
authors generally mean whether the revenues 
serving as the basis of pension payments and 
the accumulated funds will be sufficient for 
fulfilling the payment obligations under the 
regulation in force in the period subject to 
their study. 
The OeCd publishes statistics on tax burden 
on an annual basis. Another organisation 
publishing comprehensive statistics is 
eurostat. in recent years, the centralization 
reported by the two organisations differ from 
each other with 1-2 percentage points in the 
case of 4-5 continental countries. The primary 
reason for this is that the european union 
switched to the application of the so-called 
total tax burden containing net social security 
contributions in its statistics. This indicator is 
used in eu practice nowadays.
The 2019 issue of the eu taxation trends1 
sets out 4 types of tax burden indices (Page 
258), out of which type 2 is based on the 
net social security contribution, which also 
includes the so-called imputed social security 
contribution. The publication demonstrates 
the difference between index 2 and index 4 
broken down to countries on diagrams, see 
page 259. essentially, this difference is the 
imputed social security contribution. The 
imputed social security contribution mainly 
covers the contributions not paid by the state 
employer after public sector workers (e.g. 
military personnel).2
The eu administration further strengthens 
this trend. For example, in the annex of the 
Convergence Reports of 2019,3 the above-
stated index of tax burden/GdP was indicated 
amongst the data to be aggregated in the case 
of state taxes.
The OeCd presents the revenue processes 
of each country in its Revenue Statistics 
publication in detail on an annual basis. in 
terms of payments, it calculates an indicator 
for the tax burden in which the payments to 
occupational pension funds do not qualify as 
state payments.4
The field of economy usually uses either the 
tax burden indicator of the european union 
and or that of the OeCd. The question 
arises why the analysts of taxation trends do 
not use indicators that better demonstrate 
real differences. in practice, these analysists 
primarily aim to present the trends of the 
period subject to their analysis. Therefore, they 
do not putter around with calculating new 
indicators, but take over the tables produced 
by the eu or by the OeCd.
THe aPPrOaCH OF eCOnOMIC 
OPeraTOrs
An important factor is for whom the value of 
a tax burden of the specific countries provides 
relevant information.
 For the economic operators of the 
country, the amount remaining from their 
realized revenues and the amount of the net 
wage payable by them might be important.
As permanent participants, they can assess 
that not only the extent of the specific types of 
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tax is important, but the total burden resulting 
from them, too. As, for example, if the 
mitigation of wage burdens is accompanied by 
the increase of consumption taxes, then in a 
few years, employees can pass the burdens of 
increasing price levels on to their employers.
 For the working capital aiming to invest 
in the given country or region, the extent of 
net wages it can pay to the workers and the 
dividend it can generate from its revenues is 
primarily important when assessing the costs 
side.
 Whether the given state can realize surplus 
revenues in taxes (contributions) in a possible 
emergency might be of importance for the 
financial investors taking over the bonds of 
a country. in a country already “maximised” 
in terms of taxation (such as denmark or 
Sweden), this could run into severe difficulties.
THe COunTrIes analysed and THeIr 
ClassIFICaTIOn
in addition to eu member states, we also 
considered important the evaluation of 
countries belonging to the european culture 
group, in a manner that the cardinality of 
countries be confined. Therefore, in addition 
to the eu, we examined the former British 
dominions (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) 
and the uSA, and within europe, we analysed 
countries with a population of at least 1 
million and with an annual GdP of at least 
euros 20 billion.5 
We summarized the results of our 
calculations separately for four groups – based 
on the ratio of payments containing the full 
scope of pension payments. These are the 
following:
•	the countries with a pension system 
established based on the Bismarck model 
in Western and Southern europe
•	the four european continental countries 
also demonstrating Anglo-Saxon influences 
in their pension systems (Netherlands, 
denmark, Switzerland, Sweden)
•	the (peer) eastern Central european 
countries
•	the countries having a pension system 
with dominant Anglo-Saxon features:   
two states of the British islands, (Great 
Britain, ireland) and the overseas countries 
(uSA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia).
in the followings, we will examine and 
analyze which factors determine the ratio of 
current revenues distribution attributable to 
the state. in this context, we will review the 
role played by tax burden in the analysis of 
competitiveness. 
Our article does not include a comparison 
between state and private pension benefits.6
We would like to note that in this article, 
we focus on payments for pension purposes, 
but similar issues may be raised in terms of 
payments for healthcare purposes, too.
FInanCIng PensIOns  
and sTaTIsTICs
There are two main categories of non-state 
pension funds. One encompasses the schemes 
operating on an occupational basis, while the 
other covers funds financed through personal 
payments. 
The differentiation between personal and 
occupational pension funds is built on whether
•	the employer initiates the payment into 
the pension fund and fund management 
or 
•	the employee individually (independently 
from his or her employer) chooses the 
fund he/she would like to join.
Figure 1 shows the ratio of contribution 
paid to occupational and personal pension 
funds to GdP in the countries subject to our 
study.
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Within personal pension funds, private and 
voluntary funds are differentiated. Payments 
to these funds only reach 1% of the GdP 
in certain member states of the european 
union – that is, their role is less significant 
than that of occupational pension funds. 
The mandatory personal scheme is applied in 
several Central eastern european countries 
– eu statistics display these as part of social 
security contributions (this is justified from 
the point that technically it is the state that 
collects and transfers it to the private pension 
funds).
The OeCd data system classifies private 
pension funds as follows: 
2 Private pension schemes
 2/A/ Occupational pension funds
  2/A/1  Mandatory or quasi mandatory 
funds
  2/A/2 voluntary funds7
 2/B/ Personal pension funds
  2/B/1  The mandatory contribution 
is collected by: the state. in the 
case of these funds, the state 
transfers the collected (otherwise 
mandatory) contributions to 
the private funds.
  2/B/2  The voluntary contribution is 
collected by: the pension fund 
On page 147 of Pensions at a Glance 2017, 
the OeCd classifies the private occupational 
pension schemes of the different countries 
into the various categories as follows:
•	it classifies the occupational pension 
systems of Australia, denmark, Finland, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and 
Sweden as mandatory or quasi mandatory,
•	it classifies the pension schemes of 
Canada, ireland, Britain, the uSA and 
New Zealand as voluntary. 
Figure 1
Private Pension contribution Payments  
(Data as a Percentage of gDP in 2017)
Comments: The overall data is not from 2017 in the case of the following countries: 2016 (uK), 2015 (be, esT, Fr, gr), 2014 (nZ), 2012 (Can) 
*The personal pension contribution is included in the eu state tax rate
Source: https://stats2.digitalresources.jisc.ac.uk/
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in OeCd’s definition, a scheme is voluntary 
if the economic entity can freely establish a 
pension fund and can make its workers enter 
the same.
in addition to the revenues of the state 
pension system, eurostat also counts the 
personal pension fund payments collected by 
the state into the indicator of state tax burden 
(2B/1 items). (in the case of the countries 
marked with * in Figure 1). However, it does 
not calculate the revenues of occupational 
pension funds (2/A) into the indicator, and 
neither does it include the contributions 
of personal pension systems operating on a 
voluntary basis (2/B/2).
to calculate our own ratio, we introduced a 
new subcategory, under the title “payments”. 
We classified each and every payment (not 
made to the state) that the economic entity 
and the employee cannot avoid to pay. 
due to their mandatory nature, we 
straightaway classified the contribution 
revenues of occupational funds under Point 
2/A/1 as “payments.” in our view, the revenues 
of independent occupational pension funds 
under Point 2/A/2 should also be considered 
payments (in the following countries: Great 
Britain, ireland, Canada, New Zealand, uSA). 
We added said non-state pension fund 
contributions classified as “payments” to the 
value of the total tax burden calculated by 
eurostat.
We introduce 3 arguments to substantiate 
our point:
Ad B1 in these countries, the employers are 
required to enroll new employees automatically 
into a pension system if such employee is not 
a member of any private pension systems yet 
(this is called auto-enrollment). individuals 
may only opt out from these funds if they 
transfer to another private pension fund (opt-
out proceeding).8
Ad   B2 Governments also strongly encourage 
payments to occupational pension funds with 
tax allowances (a value reaching 0.8-1.5% of 
the GdP annually). in the case of the British, 
for example, payments to these funds are 
exempted from tax, and the proceeds of the 
fund’s investments are also exempted. 
Ad B3 The system of occupational pension 
funds is closely linked to state retirement 
benefits. Their pension pay-outs are established 
in a manner taking into consideration the 
income available through the state (low) 
pensions – therefore, they focus on paying 
an amount exceeding the aforementioned 
minimum pension when the individual reaches 
old age. This way, there is a sort of symbiosis 
between the public and the private sector.
For employers, the payments made to the 
occupational pension funds cannot become 
profit (including dividend), and neither can 
the workers receive it in their net current 
revenues. in this sense, the system is similar 
to the schemes classified as mandatory 
(Netherlands, denmark, Australia) – that is, 
the contribution is separated into the pension 
fund, and the concerned workers can only 
receive it as pension, decades later. Neither 
the employer, nor the employee may dispose 
over it in the short term, therefore, it has the 
economic impact of regular social security 
contributions. This means that for economic 
agents, payments to occupational pension 
funds have the same effect as social security 
contributions paid to the state. (See Table 1)
Our PrOPOsal FOr a new raTIO
The index we propose is the ratio of disposable 
current revenues. The indicator is calculated in 
two steps.
Calculating the “adjusted tax burden”
First we determine the size of the category 
we define as “payments” in the given country. 
Then we add the value of this “payment” 
to indicator No. 2 of the eu. This is how 
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we receive the “adjusted tax burden.” This 
demonstrates the ratio of revenues (e.g. 
GdP) taken away from economic agents by 
the state. 
determining the ratio of disposable 
current revenues.
determining this ratio is easy: we deduct 
the value of the abovementioned “adjusted tax 
burden” from 1 (i.e. 100%).
The two-tier calculation is appropriate and 
practical because in this way, the ratio of the 
“adjusted tax burden” is available, which can 
directly be compared with the ratio provided 
by OeCd or eurostat for the total tax content. 
Substantive differences will only be seen in 
countries where occupational pension systems 
are in operation. 
in the case of payments levied on the 
labour forming the basic pillar of the tax 
burden, Giday and Mádi already established 
that its generally used indicator, the tax 
wedge, gives a distorted image in the case of 
eu member states applying private pension 
systems of a mandatory nature. Therefore, 
they recommended that the tax wedge 
increased with the mandatory private pension 
contributions be taken into consideration 
when comparing these countries.9
Table 1
occuPational Pension funDs from the PersPective of economic agents 
mandatory 
private pension 
fund
mandatory 
private pension 
fund
“Voluntary” 
private pension 
fund 
“Voluntary” 
private pension 
fund
economic agents Workers employers Workers employers
Is it possible to avoid 
payments to occupational 
pension funds?
no (due to collective 
agreements) 
no (due to collective 
agreements)
No (due to automatic 
enrollment)
No (due to automatic 
enrollment)
Can the payments be 
utilised in the next 10-15 
years?
no no No No
state influence on the 
regularity of pension fund 
asset management?
strong Significant
The condition of tax 
allowance on payments
Compliance with 
requirements 
pertaining to asset 
management
Compliance with 
requirements 
pertaining to asset 
management
Is it mandatory? Practically yes Practically yes Theoretically no Theoretically no
Is the pay-out of the 
occupational pension funds 
built on the state minimum 
pension benefits?
yes Yes
Source: edited by the author 
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THe raTIO OF adJusTed Tax burden 
and dIsPOsable CurrenT revenues 
In THe FOur grOuPs OF COunTrIes 
subJeCT TO Our analysIs
Figures 2/a and 2/b show the percentage ratio 
of the adjusted tax burden, while Table 2 
demonstrates the ratio of disposable current 
revenues.
The majority of  old continental  
EU member states
A comprehensive state pension system operates 
in these countries. Therefore, the rates of taxes 
and contributions are usually high. As a result, 
the disposable current revenues and its ratio 
are low. The tax burden indicator calculated 
by the eu shows a high value. The values 
of the system proposed by us do not deviate 
from this, because occupational pension funds 
only operate in a limited scope. The average of 
the adjusted tax burden of the group is high, 
42.5%.
Peer Eastern-Central European 
Countries (new EU member states)
in the case of the majority of these countries, 
the tax burden indicator is of medium level, 
only one or two countries approach the higher 
Western european rates, but there are also 
countries with less payments (e.g. Romania, 
Bulgaria). The average is 34.1 percent. in the 
past 10 years, half of the countries abolished 
the previously introduced private pension 
fund schemes or significantly limited their 
contributions.10 The eu indicator of tax 
burden gives a true image, because eurostat 
switched to qualifying payments to the 
personal private pension funds as mandatory 
payments a few years ago.11
The Scandinavian type 
The continental countries of europe applying 
occupational pension schemes extensively.12 
Five countries can be classified into 
this category (the Netherlands, Norway, 
Switzerland, denmark, Sweden). A common 
feature of the countries is that payments 
to occupational pension funds, which are 
generally organized on a professional basis, 
can be regarded as mandatory. This fund 
scheme operates under a strong supervision by 
the state or under strict corporate control.
in 4 of the countries, the tax burden is high 
in the first place13 – which further increases if 
we take mandatory payments into account. 
Switzerland has a different situation. in the 
case of the Swiss, the OeCd tax burden index 
is relatively low, but jumps to a medium level 
when calculating the “adjusted tax burden.” 
However, this level is still 5-8 percentage points 
behind the values of the other 4 countries. The 
average of the tax burden of the country group 
increases with 4 percentage points (to 43.3%), 
which means that it exceeds the level of the 
previous group.
The lower tax burden in Switzerland is 
partly explained by their unique housing 
system. Possessing apartments is rare amongst 
the population, while renting apartments is 
widespread, with high rent levels. The level 
of payments are kept low by the government 
and/or corporate institutions, so that such 
housing burden can be paid even by those 
with revenues falling behind the average.
Countries demonstrating a strong 
Anglo-Saxon influence 
in opposition to the Bismarck pension system, 
occupational pension schemes are in place 
in these countries that are controlled by a 
supervisory agency keeping things on a not 
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Figure 2/a
aDjusteD tax burDen
Figure 2/b
aDjusteD tax burDen
Notes to Figures 2/a and 2/b: in the course of adjustment, we added the figures of occupational pension fund contribution of Figure 1 to the 
tax burden – the adjusted data is an estimate.
Source: eurostat: government revenue, expenditure and main aggregates. http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.
do?wai=true&dataset=gov_10a_main, OeCd (2019)
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Table 2
DisPosable current revenues in gDP Percentage
calculated from eu and oecD 
data
calculated from the data of the 
adjusted tax burden
in 2018
State pension system (Old member states)
belgium 53.1 51.7
germany 59.5 59.5
greece 58.6 58.6
spain 64.9 64.9
France 51.6 51.6
Italy 57.9 57.3
austria 57.5 57.5
Portugal 62.5 62.0
Finland 57.5 56.3
Mandatory occupational pension funds
denmark 53.7 46.1
the netherlands 60.9 57.0
sweden 55.4 53.4
norway 61.0 58.4
switzerland 71.3 63.1
Pension system with Anglo-Saxon influence
australia 72.2 67.8
Ireland 76.7 75.9
great britain 64.4 62.0
new Zealand 68.0 67.1
Canada* 67.8 64.1
usa 72.9 68.0
State pension system (New member states)
bulgaria 70.2 70.2
Czech republic 64.0 64.0
Croatia 61.5 61.5
estonia 66.7 66.7
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too tight rein. Poverty policy attempts to make 
the (otherwise large) masses of those falling 
out of the system bearable. According to the 
traditionally calculated indicator of tax burden, 
these countries can be classified into the lower 
third of countries with medium payments. 
if we calculate with our adjusted indices, the 
amount paid by economic agents to other 
institutions will increase. Owing to this, they 
can be regarded as countries with medium 
payments in our system. Adjustment increases 
the average of the group from 28.2 to 32.5%. 
After our adjustment, the ranking of 
countries changes in terms of tax burden. 
The British and their dominions’ as well as 
the uSA’s ratios to GdP increase with 1-5 
percentage point, and there is an even greater 
increase in the case of Switzerland. This way, 
there are only a few, exceptional countries 
where the value of payments is below 30%. 
This means that fulfilling the requirements 
of the european culture group doesn’t come 
free. in the two countries with exceptionally 
low indicators, the values are explained by 
unique factors. in the case of ireland, the 
profit achieved by foreign capital gives an 
extraordinarily high share of the GdP,14 
and the country’s population is younger. in 
Romania, the ratio is decreased significantly by 
the weight of agriculture and grey economy.15
if one wishes to know whether the adjusted 
tax burden is high or low in a given country, 
we consider the index below 32% low, the 
indicator is medium level between 32% 
to 38%, and ratios above 38% should be 
considered high. if we review the values with 
these limits, we can see high ratios in the case 
of old continental eu member states, with 
one exception. The exception is Spain, with 
a medium value. The adjusted index of the 
five european countries using the mandatory 
occupational pension system more extensively 
is high, with Switzerland being the only 
country with medium value. in the countries 
demonstrating a strong Anglo-Saxon influence, 
the adjusted indicator is medium level, with 
ireland’s extraordinarily low value being the 
exception. Out of peer new eu member states, 
Croatia’s index is high, Bulgaria and Romania 
have low indices, and the rest of them can be 
classified into the medium category.
Figure 2 demonstrates the share of GdP 
provided by the disposable current revenues 
after deducting the adjusted tax burden. it can 
be seen that we received the value by deducting 
the values in Figure 2/a and 2/b from 100%.
calculated from eu and oecD 
data
calculated from the data of the 
adjusted tax burden
in 2018
latvia 69.0 68.5
lithuania 69.7 69.7
Hungary 62.6 62.6
Poland 64.0 64.0
romania 73.3 73.3
slovenia 63.3 63.3
slovakia 67.0 67.0
Note:* estimate
Source: own calculation
 StudieS 
Public Finance Quarterly  2020/2 273
FaCTOrs InFluenCIng THe sHare  
OF PayMenTs 
the situation of infrastructure. The 
extent of the tax burden is influenced by the 
infrastructural network, as well as the nature 
and condition of the same. For coastal states, 
less investments are needed for developing 
the transportation connections necessary for 
international division of labour than in the 
case of landlocked countries.
Centralisation. Centralisation aspirations 
can also bear an impact on the index. Many 
times in large countries, a certain kind of 
“imperial” aspiration emerges, aiming to 
make the more distant parts of the country 
easily accessible from the capital even in spite 
of high costs, in order to make sure their 
separation aspirations don’t grow stronger 
(for example the rapid transit train and the 
motorway network in the case of France and 
Spain).
economic cycle. during downturns, tax 
burden is lower as a means of recovery. On the 
other hand, in a period of prosperity promising 
to be lasting, taxes are raised16 to get revenues 
for reducing the existing debt.
the burden of public debt. Countries 
accumulating greater debt must collect more 
taxes due to the interests on their debts.
the share of people living off agriculture. 
Agriculture is usually characterized by low 
mandatory payments on both the production 
side (taxes on revenues) and the consumption 
side (vAt, etc.). in the case of more traditional 
family farms, self-consumption continues 
to be significant even today. infrastructure is 
also more limited in rural areas. A significant 
share of farmers keep working even after they 
reached retirement age, and get lower pension 
benefits compared to urban population.
the share of grey economy. in the case 
of an extensive grey economy, the state’s 
possibility to levy taxes is more limited. Out of 
the countries subject to our analysis, the role 
of the second economy is above the average 
in the case of Romania and Bulgaria. in the 
case of the former, 19% of recognised GdP 
came from illegal sources. This value amounts 
to 14%17 in the case of the latter. 
Revenues from mining royalties. 
Presumably, these are not always indicated 
amongst taxes. in many cases, the royalties are 
collected as lump sum fees (e.g. concession 
fees). Significant royalty-like revenues are 
primarily generated in countries rich in mining 
resources, and especially in countries with 
substantial hydrocarbon mining activity. We 
did not analyse this factor in our study.
Mining royalties are significant in the case 
of Canada, Australia, the uSA, Romania as 
well as Norway, Great Britain and denmark 
(in the case of the latter three, on account of 
mining North Sea hydrocarbons).
Ageing of the population. Ageing is 
a common factor in the case of countries 
belonging to the european culture group due 
to the low birth rates. 
This can be measured with the dependency 
rate. We must note that
•	this rate is more favourable in countries 
where the birth rate was higher than the 
rate in europe even in the ‘80s (Poland, 
ireland), 
•	migration to former British dominions 
(Canada, Australia, New Zealand) from 
the motherland has been a significant 
trend for long decades now, but also from 
other european countries – resulting in a 
lower rate of old age population. A similar 
phenomenon can be observed in the case 
of the uSA, too.18 
the impact of capital and resource flows 
within the eu 
•	in new member states, the ratio is 
decreased by the significant amounts of 
profit achieved by Western capital (as its 
willingness to tax is relatively low),
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•	the eu’s resources serving convergence 
allow for the development of the 
underdeveloped regions of eastern and 
Mediterranean member states, and, thus, 
they relieve the state from covering the 
entirety of such expenses from resources 
collected from taxes on a temporary basis. 
Tax burden and COMPeTITIveness 
ranKIngs
Measuring the competitiveness of a national 
economy is a complex task. usually it is not 
measured with a single ratio, but on the basis 
of the position of the given country in the 
ranking of national economies compiled based 
on a certain set of criteria as well as based on 
the change of such position. 
Although universally the factors influencing 
the competitiveness of a national economy 
are not well defined and many times the 
components of competitiveness rankings are 
not even supported  scientifically (vargha, 
Németh, Pályi, 2019), but in the majority 
of the cases, tax burden and the tax regime 
also play a role, many times as an element of 
underlying factors.
Complex indicator systems are taken 
into account when compiling the rankings. 
Several organizations compile competitiveness 
rankings based on indicator systems, including 
the international institute for Management 
development (iMd), the World economic 
Forum (WeF), the international Monetary 
Fund (iMF) or the tax Foundation. The 
proceedings building on sets of indicators may 
differ from each other in several aspects. On 
the one hand, they can differ in terms of the 
composition of the set, and also in terms of 
the operations carried out with the indicators 
(Szilágyi, 2008). From the perspective of 
our study, the main issue out of the factors 
determining the ranking of a given country 
is the factor whether public charges levied on 
wages are taken into consideration.
 The WeF has compiled competitiveness 
rankings since 1979. They put productivity in 
the focus when determining competitiveness. 
They build their measurement on an indicator 
system classified into 12 pillars. Based on the 
foregoing, they provide three sub-indicators, 
and calculate the general competitiveness 
index (GCi) from these (Csath, 2019). The 
majority of indicators used are based on 
surveying opinions, and only a smaller part 
of them is based on a numerical value. No 
quantified data of charges on wages is included 
amongst the values measured.
 The Swiss iMd’s approach towards setting 
up the competitiveness rankings compiled 
since 1989 is similar to that of the WeF.19 
They rank countries based on the environment 
they are able to provide to the companies 
operating in their territory to ensure their 
competitiveness. Their method encompasses 
four areas, and divide each of them into five 
sub-areas. They use 261 indicators to establish 
the ranking. two third of these indicators 
are based on statistical data, and a smaller 
share is established with surveys. One of the 
factors amongst the 5 analysed within the sub-
area pertaining to public finances is taxation, 
which means that in the case of the iMd, 
5% of the total score depends on the position 
taken by the given country in the ranking 
generated according to the analyzed taxation 
perspectives.
if we look at how large a change may be 
caused by taking the occupational pension 
into consideration, we can see that it influences 
approximately 1.5% of the overall score. They 
also rank other factors in addition to the total 
tax burden or the social security contributions 
(rate of personal income tax, tax burden of 
profit, burden of consumption tax, etc.)
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 Since 2013, the Hungarian Central Bank 
has also been monitoring the competitiveness 
of the country in its reports. to that end, it 
interpreted the concept of competitiveness 
and established its own indicator system. 
According to the definition of the Hungarian 
Central Bank, “a national economy is competitive 
if it utilizes its available resources optimally 
to attain the highest possible, but at the same 
time sustainable level of welfare” (Hungarian 
Central Bank, 2019, p. 6) The Hungarian 
Central Bank measures the competitiveness 
of the country through more than a hundred 
quantified indicators. These indicators include 
several indices related to public charges. The 
macro indicator is the indicator representing 
tax centralisation, measuring the total tax and 
contribution burdens compared to the GdP. 
The Hungarian Central Bank’s report contains 
the extent of the tax wedge, as the ratio of tax 
and contribution charges to average salary.20 
The indicator calculated from the perspective 
of the competitiveness of businesses is the 
total tax rate of businesses as a percentage of 
pre-tax profit, showing the tax burden of a 
hypothetical domestic company employing 
sixty people (Hungarian Central Bank, 2017).
 The Washington-based tax Foundation 
calculated a separate tax competitiveness index 
(2018). More than forty factors are considered 
for calculating the index. With the help of 
these, they pay attention to the rate of tax 
burdens as well as the structure of taxation 
and tax regulation. The tax Foundation’s 
assessment is based on how a given economic 
agent assesses in the course of a specific action. 
Therefore, it is important to them how much 
money can be paid to workers and how the 
profit changes by upping production with one 
unit. This means that they consider marginal 
rates and average burdens equally important, 
and they analyse the scope of taxpayers 
concerned by higher rates.21 
taxation’s impact on competitiveness is 
also emphasized by several pieces of literature. 
Nagy (2017) mentions the appreciation of fiscal 
policy in terms of competitiveness. He primarily 
draws attention to the structure of taxation and 
to keeping the marginal tax rates at a low level.22
What is the role of the tax burden in setting 
up competitiveness rankings? Although it may 
seem obvious at first glance that countries with 
lower tax and contribution rates are considered 
more competitive, in reality, the situation is 
far from being this simple. The scores received 
on account of taxation give one tenth or one 
sixth of the total scores achieved. However, 
there are many factors in which primarily 
those countries can get higher scores that have 
sufficient revenues with which they provide 
the basis for higher public expenditures (e.g. 
pro-rated to the GdP). What a country gains 
at the toll, loses at the customs.
in terms of education, infrastructure, 
health care etc., countries levying higher taxes 
can attain a more favourable position provided 
that they utilise the revenues collected for 
social purposes efficiently.
if a country applies an occupational pension 
system, then current statistics generally do not 
calculate the payments to these funds into 
the tax burden. As a result, they will achieve 
lower values in two indicators and thus a 
more favourable position in the ranking, one 
being the ratio of total tax burden per GdP 
and the other being the ratio of social security 
contributions to GdP.23 
suMMary
We investigated the issue of to what extent 
the ratios applied in practice can be used to 
compare the tax burdens of different countries.
We arrived to the conclusion that tax burden 
ratios used currently fail to give a fair view of the 
share of income left for employees and employers 
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after all mandatory payments have been settled. 
The reason for this is that the contributions paid 
to occupational pension funds are not included 
in total tax burden calculations. The economic 
agents cannot freely dispose of the amounts 
payable on a mandatorily and quasi mandatorily 
basis to non-state schemes in a given period. 
These amounts cannot be used for accumulation 
or consumption, by neither the employers nor the 
employees.
instead of the recipient of payment, we believe 
it is the fact of contribution (payment) that should 
be put into the centre of analyses. Therefore, our 
recommended solution is the calculation of the 
disposable current revenues, and the indicator 
of the share generated from the same.
Appendices
Appendix No. 1
Pension moDels
The differences between pension systems can 
be reviewed more easily if we introduce the 
two basic models. 
The majority of continental countries 
apply the pension system financed by the state 
and named after Bismarck. They only operate 
systems that: 
•	support elderly people with low incomes 
for a certain reason,
•	provide discounted pension savings for 
high earners on a complementary basis.
in the countries influenced by Anglo-
Saxon pension traditions, there is a minimum 
monetary benefit provided to old-age 
residents or citizens by default. Theoretically 
the state pension system covers high earners, 
too, but in practice those concerned usually 
switch to a private pension fund. They 
embrace the opportunity lying in the fact that 
contributions to private pension funds are 
encouraged by the state with significant tax 
allowances.
Five Northern and Central european 
continental countries apply certain elements of 
the Anglo-Saxon approach. in these countries, 
those of retired age are financed in a two-tier 
system:
•	on the one hand, there is an element 
providing minimum benefit, generally 
available for those who have spent a 
significant number of years during their 
adulthood in the given country. This basic 
benefit is gradually eliminated as one 
approaches the average pension level; 
•	on the other hand, occupational pension 
schemes provide benefits.
Table 3 demonstrates as a percentage of 
GdP 
•	the ratio of old-age pension pay-out and, 
within the same, the pay-out of private 
pension funds, 
•	the ratio of the weight of tax allowances 
provided for paying the pension 
contributions.
Table 4 demonstrates the share of 
mandatorily paid pension contributions as 
a percentage of income. The table does not 
contain the payments of occupational schemes 
not qualified by OeCd as mandatory (in the 
case of Canada, uSA, Great Britain, ireland.24)
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Table 3
olD-age Pension Payout as a Percentage of gDP
state and private pension 
payout 
out of this, 
private pension
tax allowance
type of pension
2015 2015 2015
australia 9.0 4.7 1.7 m
austria 14.0 0.7 0.0 v
belgium 11.8 1.1 0.2 v
Canada 7.8 3.1 1.9 v
Czech republic 8.4 0.3 m
denmark 11.5 2.6 q/m
denmark 0.8 v
estonia 7.0 0.7
Finland 11.6 0.2 0.1 v
France 14.1 0.0 0.1 m
France 0.1 v
germany 10.9 0.8 1.0 v
greece 16.9 0.1 v
Hungary 9.2 0.0
Ireland 4.7 1.1 1.0 v
Italy 17.4 1.2 0.0 v
latvia 7.0 0.1
lithuania 6.7
the netherlands 11.2 5.8 q
new Zealand 4.9
norway 7.6 1.0 0.2 v/m
Poland* 11.1
Portugal 14.0 0.7 0.0 v
slovakia 7.7 0.4 v
slovenia 11.1 0.3
spain 11.5 0.4 0.2 v
sweden 10.1 2.9 q/m
switzerland 11.5 5.1 1.2 m
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Table 4
manDatory Pension contributions as a Percentage of gross income in 2018
state, 
employee
state, 
employer
Private, 
employee
Private, 
employer
total
the effective 
contribution of 
workers earning 
an average income 
australia 0,0 9,5 9,5 9,5
austria*  10,3 12,6 22,8 22,8
belgium 7,5 8,9 16,4 16,4
Canada 5,0 5,0 9,9 9,9
Czech republic* 6,5 21,5 28,0 28,0
denmark 4,0 8,0 12,0 12,8
estonia 0,0 16,0 2,0 4,0 22,0 22,0
Finland* 6,7 [a] 17,7 24,4 [a] 24,4 [a]
France 11,2 [w] 16,3 [w] 27,5 [w] 27,5
germany* 9,3 9,3 18,6 18,6
greece 6,7 13,3 20,0 20,0
Hungary 10,0 15,5 25,5 25,5
Ireland* 4,0 10,95 14,95 14,95
Italy 9,2 23,8 33,0 33,0
latvia 10,0 10,0 20,0 20,0
lithuania (2019)25 25,1 1,9 27,0 27,0
netherlands 18,0 0,0 7,7 [w] 14,8 [w] x [w] 25,6
state and private pension 
payout 
out of this, 
private pension
tax allowance
type of pension
2015 2015 2015
great britain 11.2 0.7 1.2 m
great britain 4.3 v
usa 12.3 5.2 0.8 v
OECD 9.5 1.5 0.6
Note: type of pension: m = mandatory, q = quasi mandatory, v = voluntary   
* the data of Poland is from 2014
Source: OeCd (2019)
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The Swedish pension system set as an example 
pension system by iMF demonstrates the 
overlaying and interconnectedness of state and 
private pension systems well. 
The Swedish state pension system is 
part of the state social security system. The 
components of the state pension system are 
the pension determined based on income, 
the premium pension and the guaranteed 
pension. The Swedish state pension system 
operates along a mixed principle. Part of 
the contributions paid to the system based 
on mandatory contribution payment are 
transferred to an individual investment 
accounts system operated on a pay-as-you-
go basis. Another part of contributions is 
accumulated in a pay-as-you-earn system. 
Occupational pension plans have also earned 
some popularity as complimentary schemes, 
which promise defined pension benefits based 
on the contributions paid.
CalCulaTIng THe PensIOn 
COnTrIbuTIOn
They deduct 7% pension contribution 
from the gross wage of the employee. The 
employer pays 17.21% of this gross wage as 
contribution. This means that by deducting 
the 7% contribution burden from the 
personal income, we get the net income, and 
by comparing the amounts of the individual 
and employer payments to this income, we 
get an 18.5% rate. Out of the 18.5% rate, 
16% goes to the payment-based individual 
state, 
employee
state, 
employer
Private, 
employee
Private, 
employer
total
the effective 
contribution of 
workers earning 
an average income 
norway 7,6 10,5 0,0 2,0 20,1 20,1
Poland* 11,3 16,3 27,5 27,5
Portugal 7,2 15,5 22,7 22,7
slovakia 4,0 14,0 18,0 18,0
slovenia* 15,5 8,9 24,4 24,4
spain 4,7 23,6 28,3 28,3
sweden 7,0 10,2 0,0 4,526 [w] 21,7 [w] 21,7
switzerland 4,2 4,2 6,25 [a,w] 6,25 [a,w] 20,9 [a,w] 16,6 [a]
great britain 12,0 [w] 13,8 [w] 25,8 [w] 20,4
usa* 6,2 6,2 12,4 12,4
Comment: “a” and “w” mark average values, in the case of “a”, the extent of the contribution depends on age, while in the case of “w” in 
depends on the level of wage. In the countries marked with an asterisk (*), the contribution revenue also finances other purposes. 
Source: OeCd (2019)
Appendix No.2
the sWeDish Pension system 
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accounts payment scheme (pay as you go), 
and 2.5% goes to the individual accounts pay 
as you earn system, called premium pension. 
The personal contribution is not collected if 
the income does not reach 4% of the average 
income. There is also an upper income limit, 
113% of work income, over which the 
individual is not required to pay the personal 
contribution. in this case, the employer does 
not pay contribution either, but it has to pay 
tax to the central budget at a rate equaling the 
contribution.
Those who cannot work in regular manners 
receive certain supplements on their accounts. 
Such reasons include raising children with 
disabilities or military service.
Income-based pension
This part of the system operates as pension 
insurance. The pension is determined based 
on the total income earned during the worker’s 
lifetime. They register the amounts generated 
from contribution payments on individual 
accounts. The registry works based on a credit 
system.
if an individual deceases before reaching 
retirement age, the amount on his account is 
divided up amongst the surviving members 
of his generation. (The amount kept on the 
account may not be inherited.)
When retiring, the amount collected 
with credits is exchanged into an annuity. 
When determining the annuity they use the 
retirement age and the life expectancy as basis. 
They apply a 1.6% real interest rate when 
calculating. The pension of pensioners is 
increased in line with nominal average income, 
reducing the rate with the 1.6% value applied 
when calculating the allowance. The system 
also incorporates a balancing mechanism. 
if the incoming contributions are less then 
the value of pension pay-outs, the balance of 
individual accounts are reduced in order to 
create balance. 
Premium pension
The premium pension plan works on a pay 
as you earn basis. The contributions paid are 
deposited in individual accounts of pension 
savers. The amounts paid will be invested into 
a fund chosen by the saver. The basis of pension 
will be given by the accumulated payments and 
the yields of the same. The risk arising from the 
investment is to be borne by the saver.
Guaranteed (basic) pension
The guaranteed pension is the lowest pension 
in the individual accounts scheme. it may only 
be claimed over the age of 65. The guaranteed 
pensions are financed by public tax revenues.
eligibility criteria for the pension: the 
state pension can be claimed from the age 
of 61. Guaranteed pension is only paid to 
people over the age of 65, preconditioned on 
a minimum three years residency in Sweden. 
Full guaranteed pension is only available after 
40 years of residency in Sweden, in the case 
of residency for less than 40 years, a pro-rated 
part of the total guaranteed pension is paid to 
the individual.
Occupational pension scheme
Approximately 90% of workers belong 
to occupational pension schemes. The 
occupational pension scheme is not part of the 
mandatory state system, it is of supplementary 
nature. The conditions are largely regulated 
by collective bargaining agreements between 
the players of the labour market (Government 
Office of Sweden, 2016).
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Notes
1 taxation trends Report 2018 – european 
Commission
2 Their ratio to the eu-28 was 1.3% GdP in 2016. 
Naturally, the average is generated in a manner 
that these values are significantly higher in the case 
of some countries (e.g. Greece, Portugal, France).
3  it is prepared by countries using currencies other 
than euro, on an annual basis. 
4 The payments to private pension funds in 
countries in transition have been calculated into 
the index for some years now.
5 in certain cases, the name of the countries are indicated 
by the licence plate country code in the tables.  
in the absence of a sufficient database, we did not 
analyse non eu-member Western Balkan countries.
6 An important difference between the two is that 
while in the case of occupational pension funds, 
when there is a decrease in accumulated funds 
(for example due to a drop in share prices), the 
pensions of the people retiring at that time will 
decrease, the pension allocated by state systems do 
not decrease in the event of a drop in share prices. 
7 in the classification of the OeCd, the fund is 
voluntary if the employers themselves can decide 
whether they set up such a fund for their workers.
8 individuals may transfer from one occupational 
pension fund to another when they switch jobs.
9 A peculiarity of the situation is that the OeCd 
publishes the distorted tax wedge index in its 
annually released 500 page-long publication 
(taxing Wages), at the some time, the values 
giving a true and fair view are available on its 
website for a short period of time (indicating the 
latter as „non-tax Compulsory Payment”). Of 
course, the distortion is also similarly present in 
the countries where occupational pension funds 
collect contributions classified by the OeCd as 
non-compulsory. See Giday (p. 397).
10 See J. K. Bielecki and Mark Allen: Making Sense of 
Pension Reform 201; and Csaba Lentner: Közpénz-
ügyek és Államháztartástan, 2013 [Public Finances 
and Public Finance Management, 2013].
11 Where contributions are collected by the state.
12  We qualified a country as such if the ratio of 
employer’s payments to GdP exceeded 1.5%.
13 This is also verified by international tax burden 
indices (OeCd, eurostat).
14 török, L. page 275
15 This influence also prevails in the case of Bulgaria.
16 Or kept at appropriate levels.
17 According to data from 2009.
18 if the old age ratio is lower in a country subject to 
our analysis, then the ratio of pension and health 
care expenses to GdP could also decrease with 
2-3% (in the case of a similar level of benefits). 
Therefore, the amount of contributions can also 
decrease in their case.
19 The WeF and the iMd were established when 
the Swiss institution split into two in 1989. The 
experts according to whom the subjective opinions 
formulated about the given economic factor are 
largely sufficient in themselves for generating the 
competitiveness ranking stayed in one of them 
(WeF). The other half became iMd, building the 
evaluation on data in cases where statistical and 
other similar data are available.
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20  in terms of tax burden and the tax wedge indicator, 
they use the values of organizations criticised in 
our study (e.g. OeCd).
21 Hungary has a better than average position in 
the ranking of this institution. On the one hand 
because of its low profit tax rate, and on the other 
hand because the marginal tax rate is low due to 
the single-rate personal income tax.
22 in his study, he claims that even minor changes 
in taxes have a significant impact on the 
behaviour of economic operators. tax regulation 
by the state affects companies through several 
channels. One of such channels is the extent 
of public charges defining the totality of wage 
costs. He claims that tax competitiveness does 
not balance the impact of other competitiveness 
factors fully by all means, but its impact is 
nevertheless significant.
23 in certain cases, there may also be indicators in 
addition to the two mentioned before that measure 
the overall extent of labour-related burdens, and 
the country will have a lower (and, thus, more 
favourable) score in such ratio, too.
24 The contributions to occupational pension funds 
mean an extra burden of 9% in the uSA and 9.4 
percentage point in Great Britain on wages in the 
case of (more frequent) plans built on defined 
benefit (dB) (the financing logics of these schemes 
can be compared with state systems the best). 
Source: FiNNiSH CeNtRe FOR PeNSiONS 
(2012).
25 As the payment is given as a percentage of the so-
called super gross income, we recalculated it as a 
percentage of the gross income
26 See Appendix No. 2
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